Driven by need and desire, Benjamin Netanyahu went to war against Gaza thinking it would be a short excursion.

He needed to rehabilitate the ruling coalition after witnessing signs of rebellion spread among the more right-wing members of his government. He also desperately desired to rehabilitate his deteriorating reputation among the Israeli public and his state's eroded image of deterrence on the other side of the conflict, among the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance.

Here, it is worth noting that 'rehabilitate' is the most accurate and commonly used term (even among Israelis) to describe the personal and political motivations that drove Netanyahu to rush into battle.

Nevertheless, Netanyahu did not allow his impulses and inclinations to dictate his decision to go to war with Gaza. The man and his security and political team based their decision on a set of assumptions, most importantly:

First, that targeting three top commanders of Islamic Jihad would confound the movement, cripple its ability to respond, and leave a lasting impact on its capacity to retaliate.

Second, that the retaliation would not exceed the Gaza envelope settlements in range or last longer than a day or two in duration.

Third, that the Islamic Jihad would be left isolated, as in previous instances.

Fourth, that the element of surprise and the limited scope of Islamic Jihad's expected response would not permit a Unity of the Battlefields.

Fifth, that the strategy of 'searing the consciousness' and the 'campaign between the wars' doctrine would work as intended, and their effects would extend to all factions and arenas. This was the reasoning of Netanyahu and his security and political kitchen.

To fulfill these assumptions and clear the path before them, Netanyahu resorted to tactics he believed would aid him in his pursuit. The first tactic was to repeatedly stress that he was only targeting Islamic Jihad and had no intention of harming Hamas and the Al-Qassam Brigades. The second tactic was to activate mediation and communication channels (through UNIFIL with Lebanon and through Cairo with Gaza) to show that he did not want a wide-scale conflict on multiple fronts. The third tactic was to continue to demonize Islamic Jihad and exaggerate its ties to Tehran and the Southern Dahiyeh [Hezbollah's 'capital'] so as to claim to be fighting Iran, Hezbollah, and their 'proxies' in Gaza, and not the Palestinians. The fourth tactic was to forgo the 'Dahiyeh strategy' in dealing with Gaza this time around and avoid hitting high-rises and inflicting human casualties that would undermine Hamas and its allies' ability to continue to exercise 'self-restraint.'

After five days of intense fighting, what results did Operation Shield and Arrow reap? Were Netanyahu's calculations on point, or did they miss the mark? Which of his assumptions played out, and which eluded his grasp? Did he accomplish what he wanted, and did he manage to 'rehabilitate' his reputation, coalition, and his state's deterrent image?

Netanyahu fired the first 'arrow' of the battle, but it was the Islamic Jihad who launched the final rocket, despite losing not just three, but six of its top commanders.

Instead of a few scattered rockets falling in the Gaza envelope area, Islamic Jihad's rockets reached "Tel Aviv" and occupied Jerusalem. Instead of a 'day or two,' the battle lasted five days and could have dragged on several days or even weeks more.

Instead of the 'arrows' of the military campaign strengthening Israel's 'shield' and deterrence, the Iron Dome's failure to intercept over half of the Quds Brigades' rockets created a new breach in "Israel's" no longer impenetrable defenses.

The Islamic Jihad maintained its cohesion and resolve, while Netanyahu was stricken with confusion and anxiety after realizing that his first 'arrow' missed the mark and that his foray into Gaza would never be a mere 'short excursion' that ends once a few big names are hunted down.

Netanyahu was wagering on separating and isolating the Islamic Jihad, and repeatedly claimed that he was targeting no one else. But this time around, the result was that the Islamic Jihad attracted broad, perhaps unprecedented Palestinian national support in the rounds in which it stood exclusively at the forefront of the scene. The Joint Operations Room assumed political, moral, and ethical responsibility for the entire battle, placing the doctrine of 'separating the factions, brigades, and wings' at serious risk and showing Netanyahu that continuing the escalation and expanding its scope will only embroil everyone in the battle, willingly or unwillingly.

But more importantly, the Islamic Jihad attracted unprecedented popular support, as manifested in the crowds mourning the fallen martyrs and the people yelling Allahu Akbar from the rooftops and celebrating the victory of Operation Avenging the Free.

True, the Islamic Jihad lost eleven of its brightest young stars and leaders, and it paid the brunt of the price in blood and sacrifice, but in the wake of Operation Avenging the Free, the movement will be better equipped to replenish its ranks and arsenal, faster than Netanyahu and many others anticipate. This is the cumulative Palestinian experience in a nutshell: With Operation Shield and Arrow, another arrow has strayed off course and missed the mark.

Netanyahu and the security/political leaders surrounding him once again wagered on the strategy of 'searing the consciousness' [wearing down Palestinians] and the 'campaign between the wars' doctrine, but the results of the battle were not as expected: A single resistance faction (neither the biggest nor the strongest) shouldered the brunt of the responsibility on the ground and managed to send a million settlers fleeing to the shelters and paralyze daily life in at least half of the entity.

Meanwhile, the controversy over 'searing the consciousness' and the seriousness and feasibility of the 'campaign between the wars' has begun to rapidly spread to the Israeli interior instead of influencing Palestinian public opinion and the new Palestinian 'Gen Z.' Gaza provided a warm, nurturing environment for its resistance, while the West Bank stands on the brink of a volcano, its cities, towns, and refugee camps turning into the sites of endless daily confrontations. It is a total nightmare for the Israeli security establishment, over and above the political class. This is the third arrow to stray before it is loosened from its quiver.

Netanyahu hoped to rehabilitate his personal image, rally the ruling coalition around him, triumph against the stubborn, active opposition in the streets.

In this regard, he achieved a tactical victory, bolstering his numbers in opinion polls after an unprecedented decline, and Ben-Gvir returned to pursuing his hardline missions within the fold of the government and Knesset. But a wide range of observers and pundits in "Israel" describe these gains as modest and temporary. They anticipate that Netanyahu will find himself in a more difficult position once the guns fall silent. The opposition is unlikely to abandon its open war against him and his popularity is unlikely to endure and grow, now that Operation Shield and Arrow has reinforced what the Israelis already knew before – there will be no increase in either personal or national security, only round after round of killing and bombing.

In Operation Avenging the Free, the Islamic Jihad exceeded expectations on the battlefield and on the political front alike. It successfully absorbed the initial shock and managed to fill the vacuum left by the enemy taking out six of its top commanders within five days. The Islamic Jihad must work on researching and reviewing what happened, because "Israel" appears to have access to intelligence with potentially dire consequences if sufficient protective, safety, and security measures are not taken. Nevertheless, the movement's vigor and fighting spirit allowed it to quickly regain the initiative and control the course of the military operation until the last minute and then some.

On the political front, the Islamic Jihad negotiated with strength and resolve. It rejected the initial offers for calm, which were essentially a translation of Netanyahu's desires, and eventually reached understandings that somewhat resemble the April 1996 understandings between Hezbollah and "Israel": To give wide berth to civilians and their homes and refrain from targeting individuals (read: leaders). The failure to secure Israel's agreement to release martyr Khader 'Adnan's body was a temporary setback driven by the considerations of the moment and a cost/benefit analysis, since the Palestinian negotiator and Egyptian mediator are well aware of the heavy implications and repercussions of such a concession for Netanyahu and his coalition.

Hamas' performance has been the most debated and controversial in Palestinian and Israeli circles alike. It is the biggest faction and holds the reins of power in the Gaza Strip, yet it only sufficed with providing the Islamic Jihad with political cover through the Joint Operations Room. Observers interpreted this as a commitment to joining the fray should it spiral out of control. This may have been a key factor in pushing the Israeli side to strive to cut the battle short and agree to a calm, and even expedite it before it could devolve into a major explosion – a scenario that the Netanyahu government fears and does not want.

The fact that Hamas leaders congratulated the Islamic Jihad after the battle, praising it for its effective leadership and for bearing the brunt of the burden, confirms the modest operational bounds of Hamas' participation in the fighting. Some attributed its limited involvement to a division of roles of sorts, while others interpreted it as part of the rivalry between the two major resistance factions. A third camp attributed it to the considerations Hamas must factor in as the ruling authority in the Gaza Strip. The obligations that entail are not confined to the Strip's borders but are connected to Hamas' broader project on the Palestinian arena and its regional considerations. We, however, attribute Hamas' position and role in this battle to all of these reasons combined, especially since the movement's current stance cannot be understood in isolation from its stances in the last two battles, in which the Islamic Jihad was also at the forefront.

The PA, for its part, remained passive and absent. It was content to engage in the bare minimum of diplomatic activity typical of such occasions, including traditional communications with the UN, the Arab League, and a few capitals. The president had no compunctions about leaving Ramallah at the height of the battles in Gaza and heading to the UN to seek protection, almost groveling like a beggar.

The unification of the Palestinian arenas (Al-Quds, the West Bank, the 1948 territories, and the diaspora) was only achieved in a partial and limited sense, expressed in a few popular movements in Palestine, neighboring states, and European capitals. In our estimation, the reason for this can be attributed to two factors:

First, the battle did not reach its full potential in terms of the duration, location, and intensity of the fighting, as in the case of Operation Seif Al-Quds, for example.

The second factor is the zero-sum equation governing both sides of the [inter-Palestinian] split. Like a black hole, it is capable of swallowing most, if not all, of the gains reaped from the confrontations thanks to the steadfastness, and bravery displayed on the front lines and in open conflict zones.

The 'united arenas' doctrine is a Palestinian approach of strategic significance, as evidenced by "Israel's" concerns about it. It embodies the unity of the people, cause, and struggle, but this does not materialize automatically or spontaneously in reaction to certain actions or developments. It is a journey and a process that takes note of the varying circumstances, contexts, and conditions that the Palestinians find themselves facing and aims to achieve synchronization and coordination between battles of Palestinians everywhere, in the long-term.

Operation Avenging the Free is a day in the life of Palestine. It marks a milestone in the struggle that carries many political and military lessons and insights that must be studied carefully, not only by the Islamic Jihad, but by the various Palestinian factions and arenas of Arab resistance as well.