[link to Part 1 of this essay]

[link to Part 2 of this essay]

NOTE: In this text, the word "Parsiwân" is used to refer to the Persian-speaking population, as this term is common to all people in Afghanistan for this group. Accordingly, "Afghan" is to be understood as "Pashtun".

The two stumbling blocks in Part 2 of this essay in the push for the Pashtunisation of society (the ethnic geography and the Persian language) not only drove the Pashtun elites to persist with their not-so-effective repression of the Persian language, culture and education, but prompted them to resort to another time-tested method… 

Resettlement

The first state-ordered and practised resettlement of Pashtuns into non-Pashtun areas took place in the 19th century under the despot and mass murderer Amir Abdollrahman. (He boasted of having killed about 120,000 people.) He resettled Pashtuns in the north – in the Tajik/Uzbek areas, and in central Afghanistan – in the Hazara homelands… after "cleansing" these areas of their original inhabitants through genocidal massacres, enslavement and expulsions. He was guided in these matters by his personal advisor, British officer Sir Charles Yate. 

The motivation behind Amir Abdollrahman's resettlement policy and his numerous massacres was more in line with the prevailing circumstances and the purpose of securing power for himself and his Mohammadzâyi clan than any foresighted "Pashtunisation agenda." Nevertheless, his personal hatred of the Hazaras and the paranoia he had of the Tajiks certainly played an additional role in this policy.

The systematic resettlement of Pashtuns in statutory form was subsequently instituted in 1927 as "The Settlers to Qataghan Act" under Amanollah Khan's reign following the proclamation of Afghanistan's independence as a kingdom.

Qataghan or "Afghan Turkestan" were the old designations of a province in northern Afghanistan (which was then divided into four smaller provinces in 1963). The title of this act does not imply, of course, who these settlers would be, but this becomes clear in its text: the resettlement concerned Pashtuns from the eastern and southern provinces. At that time, mainly Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras lived in Qataghan. And this area happens to be one of the most fertile in the country.

Since Amanollah's rule to this day, Ghelzayi Pashtuns have continued to settle in that area – at various intervals but persistently. The act regulates the resettlement process for the settlers, but it does not specify the land parcel the settlers are to receive, who owns it, and how the transfer of ownership will be regulated.

This programmatic relocation of Pashtuns to non-Pashtun areas, is intended to radically change the demographic composition of society in favour of Pashtuns… which will certainly come to pass if it continues.

The Pashtun elites have always claimed that they are the majority in Afghanistan. This was also reiterated recently by Taleban government spokesman Zabiholla Mojahed when, referring to critics calling for a government "inclusive" of other ethnic groups, he said, "our government is Pashtun because we [the Pashtuns] are the majority". But even the Pashtun elites were never sure of the veracity of this claim. That is why Pashtun governments have consistently avoided a consummate and accurate census.

The latest developments in this regard do not bode well. In June 2023, Interior Minister of Pakistan Rana Sanaullah said in an interview with "Voice of America" that his government received a proposal from the Taleban in which they offered to deport TTP (Tehrike Talebane Pakistan – the Taleban Movement of Pakistan) members residing in Afghanistan from southern Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan to other areas.

Somewhat later, Zabihollah Mojahed confirmed that Pakistani immigrants from North Waziristan will be moved to areas in northern and north-western Afghanistan so that they would no longer be "a threat to Pakistan's security." Even before these official announcements were made, there were numerous reports of armed Pashtuns (who neither spoke nor understood a word of Persian) moving in large groups to Badakhshan, Panjshir and other northern provinces, where they invaded the properties and dwellings of local people and forced them to leave their homes.

Meanwhile, reports of clashes between the local population and armed Pashtuns are increasing…

The argument for "security" used by the Taleban and Pakistani officials is nothing more than a sham. It would be no problem for TTP fighters to penetrate Pakistani territory even from the north of Afghanistan to carry out their terrorist attacks.

Moreover: together with other Islamist terrorist groups from China and the Central Asian region, who have also been relocated to the north by the Taleban, they now pose an even greater threat to Afghanistan's northern neighbours that cannot be ignored.

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The US/NATO bloc is counting on these extremists for their imminent destabilisation agenda in Central Asia – aimed at containing China and Russia and eventually subjugating their populations, up to and including direct military confrontation. Additionally, in the push for their destabilisation agenda, the Talebanisation and Pashtunisation of the whole of Afghanistan can compensate for their losses of both Saudi Arabia as a vassal and their previous instrumentalisation of IS/Wahhabism. Some experts suspect that these points may have even been discussed in secret in the Doha talks (US-Taleban) and are covertly part of the Doha Agreement.

According to a report on the Sangar site, an independent anti-Taleban news organ from Afghanistan, a secret meeting took place between the Taleban and representatives of the US, UK, and Pakistan on 17th July in Kabul and on 19th July in Mazar Sharif. This meeting is said to have focussed on the implementation of certain – hitherto secret – paragraphs in the Doha Agreement, in which the Taleban had committed themselves to work for the interests of the USA/NATO in Central Asia. Accordingly, an additional front is to be opened close to Russia's southern flank – with the intention of destabilising Central Asia and drawing Russia into the melee… with the ultimate aim of changing the balance of the war in Ukraine in favour of the US and NATO.

Pakistan also expects several advantages for itself from this resettlement operation:

·       It will get rid of the TTP problem on their soil.

·       Through potential terrorist attacks by the TTP arising from Afghan soil (and those faked by the ISI), Pakistan can present itself as an innocent victim of terrorism and access financial and political support from East and West, something it has successfully pulled off in the past.

·       Demographically, the Pashtun population (the second largest in Pakistan after the Panjabis) will be reduced, freeing up land for the already overpopulated country. 

·       In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns will form the actual majority in a few decades and their aspiration for the abolition of the Durand Line will be weakened or even abandoned. 

The current circumstances at the international level are optimal for the Taleban and their "nationalist" allies to push through the Pashtunisation / Talebanisation of Afghanistan: the non-recognition of their state, the increasing erosion of the economy and security in the West and the preoccupation of the rest of the world with their own existential problems have given them free reign.

Admittedly, it is a natural human right for people to go where they can best live or survive, and citizens of a state should have the right to choose where to live, even within their own country. But when mass resettlements of specific groups with specific political objectives are imposed by those in power, they can result in conflict, injustice, and oppression that eventually lead to uprisings and bloodshed. 

The Agony of the Parsiwâns

The situation for the Parsiwâns and other ethnic groups looks catastrophic. They are leaderless and in a desolate state. Their corrupt political leaders, who made pacts with the US/NATO and with the Pashtun élites and subordinated themselves completely to them, have all fled and are hoping for support from their Western masters and for mercy from the Taleban should they return to Afghanistan for whatever reason. They have, in any case, lost their influence and standing amongst their grassroots people. Besides, they have neither ideas, nor the means, nor even the intention to regain any influence. They are burned out and useless.

The leadership of non-Pashtun society rests now solely in the hands of the local clerics – the mullahs and the maulawis – who have nothing against the Taleban anyway and simply prefer to recite Qoran verses and hadiths of the Prophet in Arabic in all matters.

What was once some sort of "intelligentsia" in society was either decimated during the forty-year war or simply died of old age – with the exception of a few surviving representatives outside the country who have no direct contact to the population. And those few "representatives" are divided amongst themselves and devoid of any concepts.

In any case, these predicaments are of little concern to other states – be they in the East or the West…Their interests might be better served by focussing on the Taleban and Pashtuns… unless they can suddenly instrumentalise the predicaments of the Parsiwâns to their own advantage.

Moscow, Tehran and Beijing – having played an important, albeit indirect role in the Taleban's struggle to oust the US from the region – have interacted directly with the Taleban after their takeover, despite the fact that they have not yet recognised them as a legitimate authority. However, as these states are still waiting for them to fulfill their conditions for recognition (establishing an "inclusive" government, halting drug traffic, and ensuring security for neighbouring states), they have now adopted a tougher tone with the Taleban.

The presence of Pakistani TTP fighters in Afghanistan (in the South and Southeast) and the recent news of their relocation in the north and north-west of the country, including threats from the other numerous Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan, obviously worry the Parsiwâns and other non-Pashtuns. But they now show no interest in armed resistance against the Taleban, as that would only lead to civil war. Another reason for this stance of theirs could be due to the fact that there is no significant resistance movement with a strong leading figure (such as Ahmadshah Massoud) on the horizon. There is currently no replacement for the Taleban.

The armed resistance that spontaneously formed in the valleys of the Hindukush in the first days after the Taleban takeover is now a phantom and exists only in a digital parallel world.

Seen in this light, the days of the Persian language as an identity-forming element and culture-shaping pillar in "God-given Afghanistan" are numbered. Iranian high culture and Khorasan's days of glory will appear perhaps as mere footnotes in Pashtun-Taleban history books.

Although the population is extremely impoverished, war-weary and struggling hard for their daily survival, one acknowledgement is steadily gathering momentum amongst them: only a large-scale, violent uprising against the Taleban and the chauvinist Pashtun élites could perhaps avert this fate... but only at a high cost of blood on both sides. Yet again…

The sole – blind – hope is "the Future" itself – it being the most unforeseeable and unpredictable factor in life. Consciousness and enlightenment will of course play the principle role here.