Strategic overview: The options the Axis of Resistance is facing
Although waiting for this storm out and continuing to benefit from the global trend seems to be the wisest option for the Axis, the two strikes did hit hard and crossed several proclaimed Red Lines.
Following the Israeli assassinations of martyrs Fouad Shokor and Ismail Haniyeh in Beirut and Tehran, respectively, the Israelis looked to many observers as a raging bull who wanted unlimited and unconditional war—but the matter is not that simple.
While escalation dominance and the mad rabid dog appearance are both part of the Israeli war strategy in the conflicts they made part of, this time, the dominance is not theirs. The Israelis are currently surrounded by what has been coined as "Soleimani's ring of fire."
This ring, as the name implies, was built during a lengthy period under the supervision and guidance of martyr Qassem Soleimani. It extends to vast territories of countries that make up, fully or partially, the Axis of Resistance. The "fire" in said ring is composed of a wide array—and a significant quantity—of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as attack drones. Some of the tools in this arsenal were built by the technology pioneer of the Axis, namely Iran, while others were acquired through technology and expertise sharing.
What do the Israelis want?
It is more likely, due to the current balance of power, that the Israeli regime wants the Americans, the regime's overlords, to fight this war for them. The current shift in the balance of power globally added to the damage the Israelis received on the international scene, indicating that there might be a perception that time is against the Israeli occupation regime.
In other words, the Israelis likely believe that "Israel" has reached its peak power, and that from now on it is all going to go downhill. "Israel" receiving pariah status globally is not seen lightly by the most sober in the regime, adding to that dilemma is what appeared as the total reliance on the US for security, a taboo in Israeli strategic thinking.
The fact that "Israel" is not a "normal country" can be well noticed in the ridiculous and extremely high threshold of victory conditions. Deterrence plays an unnaturally crucial role in the Israeli security doctrine, as a colonial entity. Deterrence in this optic does not mean achieving a certain equilibrium but that the natives must believe that the Israelis are superior and unbeatable.
Using such colonial mindset reasoning, mass murder, war crimes, and even genocide become a necessity when faced with much more numerous foes that will always look to uproot that occupation. It seemed that when faced with a strategic defeat, the Israelis simply chose to escalate, betting on an irrational and crazy gamble, that is to attack both Beirut and Tehran.
Another factor that might have played a role in the Israeli decision-making process recently is the storming of the army bases by right-wing settlers. Such unprecedented actions had intensified fears of a dormant acute internal conflict turning violent, which intensified the desire to act by offshoring that violence in search of a uniting moment.
If the Israelis wanted war at any point, it is certainly not with an exhausted army, damaged equipment, and depleted interceptors after 10 months of fighting. It seems that they perceive the situation as:
1- The war is inevitable due to limited choices.
2- Any war in the future will be fought in much harder conditions.
Why would they perceive any war as harder or even impossible in the future?
A- They are a colonial entity determined to restore absolute deterrence even if it contradicts the reasons of international relations and its customs.
B- The future is not guaranteed in light of the growing power of the Axis of Resistance as it continues to expand and narrow the technology gap.
C- The US' unconditional support for the Israeli adventure seems to be far from guaranteed in the future. This is due to a combination of internal factors added to the possibility of its entanglement with other war theaters such as East Asia.
D- As the pariah status lingers on the horizon due to their ongoing genocide in Gaza, the Israelis fear international isolation will impact their power projection and economy since they are a small entity in population and landmass it controls, so trade is crucial.
E- The internal Israeli strife was reaching its zenith before October 7th. Some of its fire started to ignite from under the ashes recently, with expectations that the conflict might turn violent once the war is over. So getting rid of the most dangerous enemies that will always be lingering in the shadows in that optic seems to be a necessity for survival.
Did the US greenlight the strikes?
While some Western media leaks indicated that the Americans were unaware of the strikes and are currently expressing "frustration" with the Israeli lack of coordination, the question remains complicated.
To answer the question we must first clarify who we mean by the US.
The crisis that has befallen the Biden administration after he withdrew his candidacy has weakened him greatly. VP Kamala Harris does not seem to care as long as the disaster is at Biden's hands as long as the genocide is over by January.
Benjamin Netanyahu most likely received promises of support from the US administration Zionists, meaning from DoD and DoS bureaucrats and elected politicians alike, so he took the gamble and rode the major escalation.
Understanding the Israeli action to attack only requires the assumption that such a gamble could have succeeded if the Axis blinked and de-escalated. Conversely, all signs here indicate that it will not bow out, because it was put in an all-or-nothing option.
Although waiting for this storm out and continuing to benefit from the global trend seems to be the wisest option for the Axis, the two strikes did hit hard and crossed several Red Lines all at once. As expressed by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the attack in Tehran became a question of honor and national pride for the Iranians. Similar statements were made regarding the attack in Beirut, indicating that it would not go unanswered even if there were a ceasefire since it broke all 3 red lines: Bombing Beirut, killing civilians, and assassinating a high-ranking official.
A sane assumption might indicate that the Israelis would try to exclude the Iranians from a possible war, but no. They seem to want everyone's heads. The contradiction here appears striking since the intensity of the threat one perceives does not affect the number of interceptors, tanks, and active soldiers you possess.
So in that case, the Israelis thought either that the assassinations would lead to deterrence, or provoke a war that the US would wage on their behalf in case the Axis of Resistance ditched the policy of patience and the lengthy accumulation of power.
While the US here definitely would benefit from the eradication of the Axis of Resistance, an expansive war in West Asia would be an endless resource pit in light of the perceived existential need to pivot east to face China.
This does not mean that the US in any way can abandon "Israel" at any point, as it is the cornerstone of its West Asia-North Africa strategy. But it would have preferred that the war stop, the Axis of Resistance isolated, Hamas strangled with soft power tools, and an Arab-Israeli NATO be created so it can allocate more resources East.
Currently, US Amphibious Squadron 4 has not arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, with 12 ships the US had announced they will be present in the region. A Marine brigade can hardly have sway in a battle that can engulf the whole region other than contributing to the evacuations of US citizens. The aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt moved on August 2 outside of the Gulf region, which is an A2/AD (Anti-access/area denial) zone for the Iranians, indicating a certain preparedness for what is about to come. A significant movement of air defense systems has been spotted across the region, aiming to bolster air defenses in Jordan, a key US ally.
War or no war?
What makes the issue even stranger is that "Israel" has taken steps that might lead to a regional war, and America is not fully prepared nor is actively preparing. According to Axios, Biden warned Israeli PM Netanyahu against counting on US intervention should he choose to escalate the situation further while asserting Washington's support and commitment to "Israel's" defense.
This reinforces the hypothesis that the Israelis are trying to drag the Americans, but that does not exclude the US from being an active party to the current war.
That will not mean anything to the countries if the US continues to lack the desire or will to restrain "Israel" due to the need for Zionist-donor money for the upcoming elections. Hence, Netanyahu has a tacit Carte Blanche regardless of what Biden advises the Israelis.
What can be expected now is a response from the Axis of an unknown scale and nature. The idea here is that any strike that is aimed at restoring deterrence would most likely push the Israelis to respond, not for some bravado, but because in their colonial logic, they will be forced, as one withdrawal can mean the disintegration of "Israel" due to its enemies no longer fearing it, which would be accompanied by the emboldening of the already-raging internal conflict.
The current dilemma here for the Axis is that pushing for war is the least profitable option on the path to liberating Palestine—while a limited strike may mean losing the shock factor if the Israelis decide to strike everyone all at once. Simultaneously, while it appears that a severe strike would have a greater chance of deterring the Israelis from responding, it risks a wider US intervention or the Israelis resorting to non-conventional options.
The issue with the Israeli hyper-escalation model is that it can only take you so far, i.e., if they were dealt one blow, they have to respond with ten in return. But the problem arises if the enemy decides to reciprocate with ten; the Israelis would not be able to respond with twenty without the US due to material limitations. In such a case, the whole colonial sand castle could collapse as the limits to their power would be unveiled.
Despite these realities, the Israelis perceive that they don't have other options than climbing the ladder, bidding all or nothing, even if it means jumping from one existential crisis to another and hoping the US would come to their rescue or the enemy would show hesitation. But will the US always be there, or will the enemies capitulate?
The Axis of Resistance can withstand many strikes for the sake of its strategy of accumulating power and waiting for the right opportunity, but "Israel" cannot take an unanswered single strike without a response, unless it paralyzes the Israeli decision-making through shock and awe or pushes the US to rein them in.
Another problem is that a limited strike by the Axis that does not affect the assets of power projection, such as the Air Force, may be met with a violent Israeli response using the same assets. Initiating the war with a limited response can get you to a point you tried to avoid, as shock and awe of the first strike were relatively lost. A strong and violent response can sometimes deter the enemy from escalating and stop the war dead in its tracks.
It can only move forward from hereon.