The making of a threat: From nuclear to chemical claims against Iran
Washington is reviving WMD allegations against Iran, drawing comparisons with the intelligence claims used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. From decades of accusations over Iran’s nuclear program to newer chemical and radiological threats, the evolving narrative raises questions about the political use of intelligence, the manufacture of consent, and the drive toward military escalation.
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The making of a threat: From nuclear to chemical claims against Iran (Image by Batoul Chamas for Al Mayadeen)
A CNN report alleging that Tehran is developing plans to target senior Trump administration officials in Washington, DC, with a so-called dirty bomb or chemical weapon has introduced a new dimension to the longstanding campaign portraying Iran as a threat to international security.
Citing seven US officials, the report claimed that new US intelligence indicated that Iran was developing plans for such an attack. It also acknowledged, however, that US officials continued to debate whether Tehran could or would attempt to carry out the alleged plot, with sources voicing that the reported planning could be an effort to develop potential options rather than an indication of an imminent attack.
Shortly after, an Axios investigation detailed Israeli allegations that Iran is developing chemical weapons, which Mossad chief Roman Gofman reportedly presented to US officials during his visit to Washington.
The claims have reportedly encountered skepticism within the US administration, with some senior officials questioning the intelligence and describing the assertions as agenda-driven. Nevertheless, the allegations have emerged as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presses Washington to resume the aggression against Iran.
The expansion of the accusations, from nuclear ambitions to chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, recalls the campaign against Iraq preceding the 2003 invasion. It also raises questions about the political function of intelligence claims in preparing public opinion for military escalation, particularly after the June 2025 US-Israeli aggression against Iran.
A familiar pretext returns
Iranian officials have rejected the latest accusations, drawing explicit parallels with the intelligence campaign used to justify the invasion of Iraq. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei noted that after an extensive campaign centered on the supposed "Iranian nuclear threat," US officials are now advancing new accusations, citing alleged indications that Tehran is pursuing biological or chemical weapons capabilities.
Baghaei pointed out that although the accusations continue to change, the underlying narrative remains disturbingly familiar. He recalled former US Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 2003 appearance before the United Nations Security Council, when he held up a small vial while presenting Washington's case that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Baghaei said the episode had since become a symbol of one of the most serious intelligence failures and major instances of political disinformation in modern history. He stressed that unsubstantiated intelligence claims about Iraq's WMD capabilities were deliberately used to rally public support ahead of the US-led invasion, whose consequences devastated Iraqi society and destabilized the wider region.
Warning that the latest accusations against Iran appear to follow "the same fraudulent script," Baghaei asked: "Has the world learned anything from the disastrous lessons of 2003, or are we about to let them deceive the public on a grand scale all over again?"
After the grand narrative of the “Iranian nuclear threat,” U.S. officials are now claiming that there are indications Iran is developing biological or chemical weapons! The allegations keep changing, but the underlying narrative remains disturbingly familiar. Once again, the world is apparently expected to suffer a bout of collective amnesia - much like Dory, the forgetful fish from Finding Nemo. Do American officials really expect the world to forget Colin Powell’s infamous appearance before the UN Security Council in 2003, when he held up a small vial as a visual representation of the alleged threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction? That moment has since become an enduring symbol of one of the most consequential intelligence failures and political deceptions in modern history. Unsubstantiated intelligence claims about Iraq’s possession of WMDs were deliberately weaponized to manufacture public support and pave the way for a military invasion. The consequences were catastrophic - not only for the Iraqi people, but for the wider region and, ultimately, for American society itself. And now we find ourselves facing ominous new allegations and a narrative that appears to be following the same fraudulent script. The question is: has the world learned anything from the disastrous lessons of 2003, or are we about to let them deceive the public on a grand scale all over again?
— Esmaeil Baqaei (@IRIMFA_SPOX) November 19, 2026
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also denounced the CNN report, describing it as part of a wider campaign to promote accusations against Tehran.
"Same false flags, same war mongering, new logos. The right’s credibility deficit is maxed out, so the messaging operation pivoted to NYT and CNN. Approved by Larry Ellison, biggest private donor to Israel’s IOF and CNN’s new owner. Media capture in full swing," Ghalibaf wrote.
Same false flags, same war mongering, new logos. The right’s credibility deficit is maxed out, so the messaging operation pivoted to NYT and CNN. Approved by Larry Ellison, biggest private donor to Israel’s IOF and CNN’s new owner. Media capture in full swing.
— محمدباقر قالیباف | MB Ghalibaf (@mb_ghalibaf) November 17, 2026
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi likewise rejected the accusations, linking them to other recent reports concerning alleged chemical weapons activities and supposed missile facilities beneath dams.
"In the past 72 hours, pro-Israel media have 'reported' that Iran is supposedly plotting to use chemical weapons in DC while building missile bases under dams. RUBBISH. Spare us the Iraq War-style propaganda, especially with Israeli fingerprints all over it. Nobody is buying it," Araghchi wrote.
In the past 72 hours, pro-Israel media have "reported" that Iran is supposedly plotting to use chemical weapons in DC while building missile bases under dams. RUBBISH. Spare us the Iraq War-style propaganda, especially with Israeli fingerprints all over it. Nobody is buying it.
— Seyed Abbas Araghchi (@araghchi) November 17, 2026
Iraq 2003: The precedent Washington cannot escape
The comparison with Iraq is rooted in the political instrumentalization of intelligence to establish the legitimacy of military intervention. On February 5, 2003, Powell addressed the UN Security Council, presenting satellite imagery, intercepted communications, and intelligence assessments as evidence that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was concealing its WMD programs.
Holding up a small vial, Powell sought to illustrate the potential danger posed by biological agents. His presentation was intended to convince the international community that Iraq constituted an urgent security threat and that its alleged weapons capabilities demanded decisive action. The Bush administration subsequently used these accusations to build domestic and international support for the invasion, while major US media organizations amplified many of its claims.
Colin Powell said “weapons of mass destruction” 17 times in his UN speech making the case for the Iraq war. He later called it a “great intelligence failure” and a blot on his record. https://t.co/BKATd21Ans https://t.co/hMQaPHmNsZ
— The Costs of War Project (@CostsOfWar) December 19, 2023
The subsequent failure to establish the central allegations concerning Iraq's alleged WMD stockpiles exposed the profound consequences of the campaign. Post-invasion investigations did not find the active stockpiles and weapons programs presented as the principal justification for war. Yet the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, mass civilian suffering, the dismantling of state institutions, and years of instability could not be reversed.
The comparison with the current accusations against Iran is particularly relevant because of the repeated use of international security institutions and intelligence-based presentations to portray a targeted state as an imminent danger.
Netanyahu's appearances before the United Nations, like Powell's presentation, sought to give political authority to claims about alleged weapons capabilities. The difference is that the campaign against Iran has unfolded over decades, with the nuclear dossier becoming the central instrument of pressure before the 2025 aggression.
Dirty bombs, exaggerated threats, and the nuclear deterrence paradox
The latest allegations also rely on terminology capable of amplifying public fear. A dirty bomb, technically known as a radiological dispersal device, combines conventional explosives with radioactive material to spread contamination. Unlike a nuclear weapon, it cannot produce a nuclear explosion. Its destructive effects are generally far more limited than those of an atomic bomb, although contamination, evacuation, economic disruption, and psychological consequences can be considerable.
The distinction matters because the expression dirty bomb can evoke images of nuclear devastation despite describing an entirely different type of device. Presenting such allegations without explaining the underlying technology risks conflating radiological contamination with nuclear warfare and encouraging a disproportionate perception of the threat.
More broadly, the accusations against Iran raise a contradiction in Washington's stated nonproliferation doctrine. The DPRK possesses nuclear weapons and a demonstrated capacity to retaliate, significantly increasing the potential costs of direct American military intervention. Iran, by contrast, has no publicly established nuclear arsenal and has nevertheless been subjected to direct US military attacks against its territory and nuclear facilities.
This comparison does not mean that nuclear weapons alone determine American foreign policy. Geography, alliances, conventional military capabilities, and regional calculations also shape Washington's decisions. Nevertheless, the contrast raises an important question about the strategic incentives created by US interventionism: does the absence of a nuclear deterrent make a country less vulnerable to military aggression, or does it leave it more exposed?
The experiences of Iraq, Libya, and Iran can influence how other states assess their security. Libya abandoned its unconventional weapons programs in 2003, yet the country subsequently became the target of NATO military intervention in 2011.
Iraq, meanwhile, was invaded despite the failure to establish the WMD stockpiles invoked to justify the war. Iran's experience adds another dimension: a country without a demonstrated nuclear arsenal has faced direct military attacks on facilities central to its nuclear program.
Such precedents can reinforce the belief among governments that possessing a credible nuclear deterrent is essential to preventing external intervention. In this sense, military coercion intended to prevent nuclear proliferation may produce the opposite strategic incentive, encouraging states to consider nuclear capabilities as protection against the very powers demanding their renunciation.
Trump's electoral defeat and the political utility of fear
The latest allegations have also emerged against a difficult domestic political backdrop for Trump. The Republican Party's losses in the November 3, 2026 midterm elections resulted in Democrats securing control of both chambers of Congress, ending unified Republican government. The Iran war and its economic consequences featured prominently in the political debate, alongside dissatisfaction with inflation and the administration's domestic priorities.
Public opinion has also reflected growing opposition to the war. A November Reuters/Ipsos poll found that only 31% of Americans approved of the war, while a pre-election YouGov survey found that 44% were less likely to support candidates backing the aggression, compared with just 13% who were more likely to do so. The war's economic burden has also mounted, with Pentagon figures putting its cost above $48 billion by early November.
Against this backdrop, portraying Iran as a direct threat to the American homeland could offer the administration a means of reframing an unpopular foreign war as a matter of national security. Allegations concerning chemical weapons and a possible attack in Washington carry a different political weight from arguments about uranium enrichment thousands of miles away.
The strategy also recalls the rally-around-the-flag effect, through which governments can experience temporary increases in public support when an external threat is presented as an immediate national emergency.
However, the political calculation could backfire. The Iraq invasion remains a defining example of the consequences of intelligence claims used to justify war, while public opposition to the current war on Iran suggests that Americans are increasingly reluctant to accept another open-ended military commitment.
Manufacturing consent: The media's role in legitimizing war
The relationship between political power, intelligence institutions, and mainstream media is central to understanding how such narratives acquire legitimacy. In Manufacturing Consent, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky examined how structural pressures within major media organizations shape coverage in ways that frequently reproduce the interests and assumptions of powerful political and economic institutions.
Applied to the Iraq invasion, their framework helps explain how intelligence claims originating within the US political and security establishment were repeatedly circulated as evidence of an established weapons threat. Anonymous intelligence assessments, official briefings, and political statements were amplified through major media organizations, creating an environment in which the invasion was increasingly presented as a necessary response rather than a political choice.
The latest reporting on Iran raises similar questions. Allegations originating from Israeli intelligence, followed by anonymous US intelligence briefings and publication by major news organizations, can acquire an appearance of independent confirmation through repetition. Once political officials cite media reports, and media organizations subsequently cite those officials, the original evidentiary basis can become increasingly difficult to distinguish from the broader political narrative.
This highlights the structural relationship between state power, intelligence institutions, and media organizations, particularly when the circulation of unverified allegations can help normalize military escalation.
Washington's willingness to attack a country without a demonstrated nuclear arsenal, while invoking nonproliferation as a central justification, also exposes the contradictions of its approach to international security.
The June 2025 and February 2026 aggressions followed decades of accusations about Iran's nuclear program, while the latest chemical, biological, and radiological weapons claims suggest that the threat narrative is now expanding.