US Patriot missile production hinges on single French supplier: WSJ
A WSJ investigation finds the US Patriot PAC-3 missile depends on one French-made material, and new production capacity will not arrive before 2028.
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Patriot missile launchers acquired from the US in 2022 are seen deployed in Warsaw, Poland, on Monday, Feb. 6, 2023. (AP Photo/Michal Dyjuk)
US production of the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor depends on a heat-resistant carbon fiber that only one French company is approved to supply, and the Pentagon cannot quickly increase that supply, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported in a recent investigation.
The shortage comes while US stocks of the weapon are low. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US think tank, estimated that about 65% of the PAC-3 stockpile had been used by the end of July, compared with levels before the US war on Iran.
The Pentagon has signed new contracts aimed at raising output to about 2,000 missiles a year by the end of 2030, but the material bottleneck stands in the way, according to the WSJ.
The component at the center of the shortage is carbonized rayon, a carbon fiber that withstands extreme heat. In a rocket motor, it protects the nozzle, the opening through which burning gases exit, from melting during combustion.
Only one manufacturer is approved to supply it for the PAC-3 MSE, the latest version of the missile. That company is ArianeGroup, which produces the material near Bordeaux in France. The WSJ noted that no alternative has been approved for this version.
Supply chain across multiple countries
The chain starts at a factory in the Czech Republic, owned by a Thailand-based chemical group, where rayon fibers are made. The fibers go to France, where they are woven into specialized fabrics. ArianeGroup, which Airbus and Safran own jointly, heat-treats the fabric into a carbon material sold under the name Raycarb.
The material then goes to Park Aerospace in Kansas, which treats it with a specialized resin. Park Aerospace supplies L3Harris, which uses it in rocket motors built for Lockheed Martin’s missile production. Boeing makes the seeker, the guidance sensor in the missile’s nose.
Each PAC-3 MSE takes about two years to build, costs close to $4 million, and needs hundreds of precision parts. Swapping the material is also not simple, and a small flaw in the motor’s materials could throw a missile off course, so approving a new supplier is both slow and expensive.
Testing can take two years, and a failure may only appear at the final stage.
Why expanding supply is difficult
A senior Pentagon official personally pushed for more of the material this year, the WSJ reported, but ArianeGroup could not raise production fast enough.
Park Aerospace CEO Brian Shore told the newspaper that pressuring the French company would not work, because it could refuse US demands. Sending more of ArianeGroup’s current output to the US would also leave less for priority European customers, including the French military.
New capacity is years away. Park Aerospace has paid $5 million upfront for an additional production line at ArianeGroup, due to start in 2028, though Park Aerospace says it will still fall short of US demand. The two companies have also signed a preliminary agreement for an ArianeGroup plant in the US, with an expected upfront payment of $25 million.
If it stays on schedule, it would open around 2030. The Pentagon tried to speed up both projects, but ArianeGroup told US officials that further acceleration would be hard.
Shore said the core problem is timing. Nobody wants to wait three and a half years for new capacity, he said, while the US military needs to refill its stockpiles now.
Same suppliers serve many missile programs
The WSJ also looked at how many suppliers the programs share, using data from the defense analytics company Air.
Suppliers are grouped in tiers. First-tier companies sell directly to the missile makers, second-tier companies sell to the first tier, and third-tier companies sell to the second.
More than 70% of the second-tier suppliers for the PAC-3 also supply THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system used against ballistic missiles. The overlap grows further down the chain.
Five US programs share about 69% of their combined 3,300 third-tier suppliers. They are the PAC-3, THAAD and the Navy’s SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles.
A disruption at one supplier could therefore slow several air and missile defense systems at once. The programs compete for funding and for the same factories, materials and workers.
How the US lost its production
WSJ traced the problem to the shrinking of the US arms industry after the Cold War.
Mergers cut the number of major aerospace and defense contractors from 51 to five. The number of small defense businesses fell 40% in the decade before a 2022 Pentagon report. Factory closures and moves of production abroad erased specialized expertise that cannot be rebuilt quickly.
Missile-grade rayon followed the same path. A major plant in Virginia closed in 1989 over environmental violations, despite $38 million in support from NASA and the Pentagon. A Tennessee plant stopped operating in 1998 after financial problems. In 2005, the US approved a material developed by a French company for Patriot missiles, leaving it reliant on European supply.
Backup options remain unproven
Germany’s Enka is one of the few European makers of a different type of specialized rayon. It had planned to shut down production after demand for commercial fabrics fell following the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pentagon and US defense companies committed to buy more than 470,000 pounds of the material over two years, which postponed the closure. Operation beyond 2028 is not guaranteed, and Enka’s material is not yet certified for the PAC-3 MSE.
Park Aerospace and L3Harris are testing other materials to cover the gap until the new plant opens, but none has finished the required qualification tests. Park Aerospace is also planning a $65 million factory in Oklahoma, even though its Kansas facility has spare capacity.
Since the constraint is the imported raw material, additional US plants would not by themselves ease the shortage.
The WSJ linked the shortage to the war in Ukraine and then the US war on Iran, which exposed flaws in the Pentagon’s assumptions about how many munitions a conflict consumes. For decades, annual purchasing plans rested on post-Cold War expectations and were not built for prolonged wars of attrition, or for confrontations with several adversaries that hold large missile arsenals at once.
Interceptor use rose sharply during the war on Iran. The US now has to rebuild its own stocks while continuing to supply allies, including Ukraine.