War on Iran puts to test nine American military supremacy illusions
Iran's sustained resistance to the US-Israeli war is exposing the limits of American military power, while civilian devastation and unreliable security guarantees undermine Washington's regional legitimacy.
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What remains of a US flag covers the street after it was burned during a protest against the visit of then-US Vice President Kamala Harris in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Friday, March 22, 2024 (AP)
From depleted interceptors to exposed military bases, the US-Israeli war on Iran is testing the promises underpinning Washington’s regional dominance, while civilian deaths deepen the crisis of its legitimacy.
Washington’s promise of protection is colliding with the consequences of its own war. Seven months after the United States and “Israel” launched their assault on Iran, depleted missile inventories, damaged bases, and Tehran’s continued resistance are exposing the limits of a military order long presented as the region’s indispensable source of security.
Read together, recent reporting and commentary across American and Western publications expose nine illusions underpinning American power: strategic stability, a reliable defensive shield, secure military bases, naval dominance, military abundance, protection through alliances, precision strikes, the ability to turn military power into political results, and an American peace.
The authors differ over what Washington should do next. Some want the rebuilding of its military advantage; others see a regional order moving beyond American dominance. Their accounts nevertheless show how the war on Iran is testing these assumptions and widening the gap between the force Washington can deploy and the outcomes it can impose.
The illusion of strategic stability
Even commentators seeking to reinforce American power acknowledge that earlier assumptions require revision. In a Wall Street Journal opinion article, Tod Lindberg and Corban Teague reject the expectation of returning to the relative stability associated with the post-Cold War era.
Their prescription is stronger deterrence and a more confrontational understanding of US adversaries. It differs sharply from arguments for American disengagement but reflects the recognition that the international environment sustaining Washington’s earlier dominance has changed.
Their argument extends confrontation beyond the battlefield to trade and information. They also describe the US alliance system as a hierarchy in which partners accepted a subordinate position in exchange for security commitments. Even this defense of American primacy acknowledges that the earlier order depended on arrangements that can no longer be taken for granted.
The illusion of a defensive shield
Christopher Leonard’s investigation in The Atlantic examines the promise of protection attached to the THAAD missile defense system. Its original purpose, he reports, was to protect critical military assets through an initial missile attack, buying time for American aircraft and warships to destroy the forces launching it.
That operational assumption acquired a much larger political role. In the UAE, THAAD became part of a layered defense package through which Washington sought to draw Abu Dhabi more firmly into its campaign against Iran. A system designed around limited protection was incorporated into a promise of national security.
Iran’s ability to keep launching missiles has exposed the weakness in that promise. Leonard reports that THAAD intercepted ballistic missiles effectively, but Washington neither accumulated sufficient interceptors for a prolonged conflict nor established the production capacity to replace them at the necessary pace.
Iran’s combined use of ballistic missiles and inexpensive drones has further strained different layers of the defensive network. THAAD’s effectiveness against ballistic missiles does not extend to low-flying Shahed drones, which require other means of interception. Continued attacks therefore impose demands across the entire system.
Leonard puts the cost of a THAAD interceptor at about $12 million, against an estimated $5 million for an Iranian Ghadr missile. That imbalance compounds the pressure of sustained attacks.
The illusion of secure bases
The war has also exposed the vulnerability of the bases sustaining American military power across the region. Writing in The Washington Post, Max Boot argues that Iranian strikes have undermined the assumption that US air superiority can keep forward bases safe.
Citing a Pentagon inspector general report, Boot describes damage to hundreds of structures and dozens of aircraft across US bases in the region. The disruption at the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain forced the Navy to rely on Diego Garcia, some 2,200 miles away, complicating resupply and increasing its cost.
“We’re not getting back in there anytime soon,” Admiral Daryl Caudle, the chief of naval operations, said of the Bahrain facility, according to Boot’s account.
Bases used to project force against Iran have themselves become vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. Protecting them consumes ammunition already needed elsewhere, while damage to ports and logistics facilities makes sustaining the wider campaign more difficult.
Boot extends the warning to a potential confrontation with China: bases across the Pacific could face the same vulnerability on a larger scale. The problem concerns the entire model of concentrating aircraft, personnel and supplies close to an adversary.
The illusion of naval dominance
American claims to naval dominance face a separate industrial constraint. In The National Interest, Jack Bharucha challenges the administration’s ambition of maritime dominance, citing an American share of global commercial shipbuilding of about 0.1%, compared with China’s share of more than half.
Those figures concern commercial construction. Bharucha’s argument is that the commercial industry sustains the skills, facilities, and production efficiencies on which naval construction also depends. A navy’s endurance rests partly on what its industrial base can build, maintain, and replace.
Bharucha traces the decline partly to the withdrawal of construction subsidies in 1981. He contrasts that approach with Chinese yards that combine commercial and military orders, allowing merchant-ship revenues, skilled labor, and production efficiencies to support warship construction.
His proposal for subsidies and a target of 5% of global commercial shipbuilding underlines the distance between Washington’s rhetoric and its productive capacity.
The illusion of military abundance
Leonard’s investigation traces the ammunition shortage to decisions made long before this war: procurement that privileged expensive platforms over sufficient munitions, fragile supply chains, and contractors unable or unwilling to expand production without firm financial commitments.
Leonard reports that Pentagon planners examining higher missile output found that some production increases would require three to six and a half years, even with funding. The bottlenecks extend beyond final assembly to specialized components and suppliers. A defective connector, for example, interrupted THAAD production for months in 2016.
The report also records the sums returned to shareholders while expansion faced obstacles: Lockheed Martin distributed $6.8 billion through dividends and share buybacks in 2024 and RTX distributed $3.7 billion. The production crisis exposes a tension between the financial priorities of major arms companies and the capacity required to sustain Washington’s military commitments.
Across interceptors and shipyards, claims of military supremacy encounter a practical question: how much can the United States replace, and how quickly, when a war refuses to end on its timetable?
The illusion of protection and alliance
The political consequences extend to weapons customers beyond the region. The Atlantic reports that Switzerland faces a four-to-five-year delay in receiving Patriot missiles and is considering alternatives, while Denmark chose a European system after prioritizing delivery speed.
Leonard explains that interoperability was itself a political objective: selling compatible weapons helped bind foreign militaries to US forces. The shortages expose the other side of that dependence. Poland refused a US request to transfer interceptors to West Asia, while Saudi Arabia sought access to cheaper Ukrainian defenses against drones.
The bargain linking arms purchases to dependable protection is consequently being reassessed. Governments that committed themselves to American systems remain dependent on production schedules and allocation decisions in Washington, even when their own security requirements become urgent.
The illusion of precision strikes
For the populations subjected to American bombardment, the central issue is the destruction these weapons inflict. The language of precision has helped Washington present its wars as controlled operations, even as civilians bear their consequences.
In an interview for Responsible Statecraft, investigative journalist Azmat Khan describes recurring failures involving outdated intelligence, the misidentification of civilians, and an operational tempo that leaves insufficient time to scrutinize targets.
The article points to the attack on a school in Minab, reporting that 123 children and dozens of other people were killed. It says an internal review reportedly identified a US missile as responsible, while neither the White House nor the Pentagon had publicly acknowledged responsibility at the time of publication.
Khan’s argument goes beyond whether a missile reaches its programmed coordinates. The decisions identifying those coordinates can rest on flawed evidence. Increasing reliance on artificial intelligence can reproduce those failures when the underlying data are already unreliable.
'Dual-use' label
Khan also questions how the “dual-use” label expands the range of civilian infrastructure treated as targetable. Her concern is the evidence used to establish a military function and how broadly that category can be applied in densely populated areas.
She also challenges the treatment of repeated civilian deaths as isolated errors, describing how inadequate investigations and reduced transparency shield the targeting process from accountability. Her discussion of double-tap strikes highlights the danger to rescuers approaching the wounded after an initial attack.
This has a political consequence: reducing the exposure of American troops can shift the human cost of war onto local populations, weakening one traditional source of domestic pressure on Washington to stop fighting. Khan nevertheless argues that younger Americans’ identification with civilian victims is creating its own pressure through activism and opposition to US arms transfers.
The illusion of turning military power into political results
The diplomatic record also challenges the belief that military superiority can reliably secure compliance. In its assessment of Trump’s recent diplomatic engagements, Reuters describes a president confronting resistance abroad while the war’s economic consequences increase pressure at home.
Iran remains central to that impasse. Despite the damage inflicted on the country, Tehran has continued resisting Washington’s demands. Reuters also reports that most European and Asian allies rejected Trump’s calls for assistance in a war he launched without consulting them.
Washington’s difficulty extends to its dealings with Beijing. The agency describes Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping as producing limited substantive results, with China’s control over rare earth minerals constraining the administration’s pressure tactics. The most tangible reported result was a two-month extension of a trade truce.
“Now Canada, Europe, China, Iran, Russia and others are all more willing to say no,” Eurasia Group president Ian Bremmer wrote, as quoted by Reuters.
The White House disputes that assessment, telling the agency that Trump’s diplomacy has advanced US interests. Yet the distance between the administration’s declarations and the outcomes described in the report illustrates a central limit of coercion: the ability to impose costs does not guarantee the ability to dictate another country’s choices.
The illusion of an American peace
Kenneth Roth’s commentary in The Guardian examines the contradiction in Trump’s rhetoric about peace. The president presented himself as a peacemaker at the United Nations while threatening to “annihilate the Islamic Republic” of Iran. Roth argues that such threats expose the coercion behind Washington’s claims to be delivering peace.
Michael Young, writing for Carnegie, locates the regional implications in three ruptures: the moral damage caused by US support for the slaughter in Gaza, the loss of confidence in American protection, and resistance to arrangements that subordinate regional interests to Washington’s priorities.
His argument places Palestine at the heart of the crisis. The US-backed Israeli genocide in Gaza has exposed the hierarchy within Washington’s regional order, in which Palestinian lives and rights are sacrificed to the preservation of Israeli power.
Young also interprets the drive to expand the so-called "Abraham Accords" as an attempt to preserve American influence through a regional structure anchored in Israeli military predominance. In his assessment, Israeli expansionism and the war on Iran have made that project increasingly unacceptable to regional states.
He points to the 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement and the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan on August 7 as evidence of efforts to diversify security relationships. Young presents the agreement as an attempt to build a regional balance that prevents any single power from imposing its dominance. Such developments indicate movement away from exclusive dependence on Washington; the shape and durability of an alternative order remain unsettled.
The military and political pressures reinforce each other. Unreliable protection gives allies reasons to diversify their partnerships. Civilian devastation deepens opposition to the order Washington claims to defend. Iran’s continued resistance raises the cost of trying to enforce that order through war.
American power remains capable of immense destruction. Its claim to determine the region’s future, however, depends on governments and societies accepting that resistance is futile and dependence unavoidable. The war on Iran is giving them mounting reasons to question both.
Read more: Ex-diplomat says Iran war 'disaster', weakened US influence: Carnegie