The era of US dominance in economic warfare is over: FT
A scholar of sanctions argues that Washington's grip on economic coercion has collapsed, and the fallout is already reshaping the global order.
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Liberia-flagged tanker Shenlong Suezmax, carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia, that arrived clearing the Strait of Hormuz, is seen at the Mumbai Port in Mumbai, India, Thursday, March 12, 2026 (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)
Nicholas Mulder, an assistant professor at Cornell University and author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, argues in a Financial Times op-ed that the United States' monopoly on economic coercion as a tool of geopolitical pressure has effectively ended.
Mulder points to two defining moments. China's imposition of export controls on refined rare earths, in retaliation for US export restrictions unveiled in late 2025, dealt a serious blow to US defense, aerospace, and automobile manufacturing, ultimately forcing Washington into economic de-escalation and the Sino-American truce brokered in South Korea in October 2025.
Then came Iran. Rather than capitulating to US "maximum pressure," Tehran responded to open war by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, severing roughly 20 percent of global oil and gas flows and one-third of the global fertiliser trade. Both adversaries deployed their own economic weapons, and both succeeded in compelling a US response.
A chain of concessions
The consequences have cascaded outward. With Iran weaponising energy transit, Washington has been forced to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil, meaning the fight against one economic adversary required retreat on another front.
The EU, which had celebrated its prospective decoupling from Russian gas, may now have no choice but to resume those purchases. What began as US "maximum pressure" on Iran has instead generated a chain of concessions that reach all the way to Moscow.
Sanctions fail
Mulder places this within a broader pattern, arguing that sanctions, whoever wields them, tend to fail.
The Gulf blockade of Qatar from 2017 to 2021 collapsed without achieving its aims. ECOWAS sanctions on Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have proven ineffective. China's own use of economic pressure, rare earth controls against Japan, and a coal ban against Australia produced the opposite of compliance, pushing both countries toward deeper antagonism with Beijing.
Sustained coercion, Mulder argues, historically pushes targeted states toward self-sufficiency and alternative partnerships, eroding the tool's effectiveness over time. Russia's post-2022 pivot to Asian markets and China's domestic chip acceleration are the most recent illustrations of this dynamic.
Most consequentially, Mulder challenges the long-held premise that sanctions serve as an alternative to war. The US campaigns against Venezuela and Iran have not averted military conflict, but have preceded and enabled it.
A world of persistent economic wars, he warns, will sooner or later spiral into actual warfare. That threshold, it would appear, has already been crossed.