How does the 'Unity of the Battlefields' protect Lebanon?

By Abbas Al-Zein, Translated by: Tala Alayli
Source: Al Mayadeen
25 Mar 2024 00:24
3 Shares

The north Palestinian front emerges from a multi-front battlefield, both in support of Gaza and in defense of Lebanon.

How does the 'Unity of the Fronts' protect Lebanon?

When Pierre Gemayel, the founder of the Lebanese Kataeb Party, incorporated the phrase "Lebanon's power rests in its weakness" in Lebanese political literature, he did not regard it from a lens that focused on Lebanon's position in regional conflicts or against foreign threats, instead, he considered his own party and leader's position and stance toward these conflicts.

While claiming a Lebanese movement cannot be powerful, for this power would be utilized against other political movements, it would later be revealed that those who preached and promoted the phrase had also been the ones who sought militarization and foreign support to use against other national groups and movements.

Despite the several interpretations that sought to validate its verity, including the contradictions found within the Lebanese reality, having the multi-sects and multi-political movements at their front, the phrase still crumbled. This was an integral consequence of the Israeli occupation's entrance to Beirut in June 1982, the announcement of Bachir Gemayel as president, and the extension of the May 17 agreement in 1983 with Amine Gemayel, which was guised as surrender, but came as a means of normalization.

The former phase not only proved that "Lebanon's power rests in its weakness", but also aimed at justifying that weakness to serve the interests of foreign agendas that disrupted the country and its security, and sought to occupy and control it. However, it also launched a new counter-phase showing how power, in the right position, is the only correct and ideal way to defend Lebanon, liberate its lands, and interdict any aggression against it.

For over 40 years, the main question has been: What is preventing "Israel" from attacking and invading Lebanon, and attempting to reach the capital, Beirut?

The response lies in another question: What forced "Israel" to retreat from Beirut, then Saida, then southern lands, to the "Blue Line", then completely withdraw from southern Lebanon and Western Bekaa in 2000?

The power of the Resistance gave Lebanon the strength to defend itself and defy its enemies, making "Lebanon's power rests in its strength" the new proven reality, and inscribing it in governmental reports within "Army, People, and Resistance". Its inscription came by popular nature, further imposed by internal power scales. And since power must be developed, strategically, tactically, politically, and militarily, as well as practically and morally, with the development of the enemy's power, it remains primarily bound to the initial project and goal.

Protection, deterrence, and defense: these three givens are directly interrelated with the alliances that could be built, and the relations that are being established, not only because of the nature that the Resistance is founded on but also the nature of the Israeli occupation in the region, as part of the extensive American setting in the region, that is capable of striking all that is isolated and detached from its dynamic environment.

The "Unity of the Battlefields" is theoretically understood to be an alliance that counters Israeli aggression; that could entail any of these fronts. This concept is based on the development of security and military capabilities of within the Axis of Resistance's state and non-state actors, at a time when "Israel" continued to make threats of expansion and war, consistently doing so as part of the American project in the region. If the "Unity of the Battlefields" holds the Palestinian cause as its most important issue, then the "Unity of the Battlefield's" repercussions in terms of defense and deterrence should extend to all parties. How?

In his latest interview with Politico, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said his goal was to "bring back all settlers that fled their houses in the north post-October 7, fearing the incursion of Hezbollah across the Palestinian-Lebanese border, and another operation resembling Hamas." Netanyahu did not rule out the use of military means to achieve that, saying "It would be alright if there were diplomatic means."

His main incentive for plotting any military operation against Lebanon stems solely from the presence of Hezbollah near the Palestinian-Lebanese borders. He, or senior officials in the Israeli occupation government or the "army", do not legitimize their threats by claiming Hezbollah launched fire against "Israel" in solidarity with Gaza on October 8, because not even a ceasefire in Gaza, which extends to Lebanon simultaneously [as the precedent during the truce in November] is enough for them. Their statements, however, affirmed their need to push Hezbollah away from the borders to a distance of seven to 10 kilometers, reaching north Litani.

On the other hand, Hezbollah ascertained, on several occasions, and with the vow of its Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, that operations will cease on the northern front if a ceasefire is established in Gaza. The promised scenario is concrete but excludes times when the Resistance mobilizes to defend Lebanon according to the size of threats and challenges.

Moreover, the Islamic Resistance's decision to be integrated into this confrontation as a front that supports the Resistance in Gaza fulfills a role in the exhaustion of the Israeli occupation, and prevents it from executing any extensive military occupation against Lebanon, by showcasing its power within specific standards.

Therefore, the north Palestinian front emerges from a multi-front battlefield, both in support of Gaza and defense of Lebanon, and one subjected to "Israel's" threats of a full-scale war that official and popular communities pay the price for if Hezbollah is not pushed away from the border, not when ceasefire fails. There has not been any Israeli official statement declaring that what is demanded is solely a ceasefire from Hezbollah's side or one that demands the separation of the Lebanese South from Gaza in the sphere of the establishment of a ceasefire.

On the contrary, Benny Gantz, a member of the Israeli War Cabinet, announced just days ago that any truce will not necessarily include Lebanon, and that the Israeli military will proceed with its operations against Hezbollah, regardless of the developments in Gaza.

Although Hezbollah is well aware of "Israel's" plots, way of thinking, and approach to several matters across different fronts, it did not decide to join the frontlines on its own, or based on reasons it does not want to reveal. Hezbollah only used that obscurity against the occupation, whereas discourse on the topic was left extensive within the Lebanese stage. Regardless, and based on the occupation's threats and its maneuvers on the battlefield after October 7, all parameters raise one question: What has Hezbollah imposed since its intervention on October 8? What are the two possibilities?

First: In case there was an Israeli plot to conduct a military operation against Lebanon, regardless of the Resistance's active support, then Hezbollah revealed through this participation the comprehensive dangers "Israel" could be exposed to, and imposed new specific rules of engagement.

Second: In case no Israeli plot existed following October 7, then Hezbollah's participation forced the occupation to be hesitant to launch an attack against Lebanon. In this case, the principle of defensive confrontation is induced against an enemy that does not respect official charters or accords, an enemy that can only be broken by force.

Considering both conjectures, The Wall Street Journal revealed on December 23 that US President Joe Biden convinced Netanyahu to revoke a preemptive strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon after Hamas' operation on October 7, to avoid a regional war.

"Israel" intending to escalate the situation into a regional war is then established as a fact. However, what is remarkable is the Americans' fear that compelled Washington to prevent "Israel" from achieving its plan, not for the war itself, but for a wider confrontation. This confirms that if "Israel" does launch a military operation against Lebanon, which supports Gaza, then all fronts in the region would intensely intervene to support Lebanon.

At this point, the United States acknowledges that the multiple fronts defend and support one another, and are united by the Palestinian cause, which should discourage "Israel" from further escalating the situation [alongside Hezbollah's capabilities and strength]. Consequently, Hezbollah's intervention to defend and protect Lebanon, while backing Gaza, has ignited the United States' fear of a regional confrontation with the Lebanese Resistance.

This is how Hezbollah protected Lebanon against an operation that could have expanded on a much wider scale.

The previous hypotheses theorized what would happen if a plot to invade Lebanon existed or not. Moving past that, if an Israeli military operation was carried out against Lebanon, then the occupation would have to face a Resistance force that is prepared and capable of retaliating to the "surprise", which kills in wars.

If it was not, on the other hand, then the rational question to ask would be, "What would Lebanon, Gaza's support, have lost?", noting that the Israeli occupation plots and threatens, not because Hezbollah backs Gaza, but because it is at the borders and possesses all kinds of military capabilities.

Hezbollah operates within this paradigm with Lebanese constituents, not by what it knows and is certain of regarding "Israel's" intentions, but by a framework that reassures these constituents, even if they are not convinced due to the mystery of sensitive information.

Lebanon's power rests within its Resistance's power, and the Resistance's power rests within the power of the battlefields it is integrated with. These are facts and realities presented in front of us, as before us lies an enemy that entered Beirut when we believed that Lebanon's weakness was a source of "strength", and in accordance with the US mediation led by Philippe Habib. So, why would Hochstein differ from Habib now? Simply put, because the Resistance exists and fights from one of many fronts, posing a danger to the US!